When the world becomes 'too real': A Bayesian explanation of autistic perception by Pellicano, L & Burr, D
1 
 
 
 
When the world becomes too real: a Bayesian 
explanation of autistic perception  
 
Elizabeth Pellicano1* & David Burr2 
1Centre for Research in Autism and Education (CRAE), Institute of Education, University of 
London, UK; 2Department of Psychology, University of Florence, Florence, Italy 
 
Abstract word count: 118 words (max. 120 words) 
Manuscript word count: 3287 (main text) + 400 (Box 1) = 3687 (max. 3700 words) 
 
*Corresponding author:  
Dr Liz Pellicano 
Centre for Research in Autism and Education 
Department of Psychology and Human Development 
Institute of Education 
25 Woburn Square     Tel: +44 (0)207 331 5140 
London WC1H 0AA     Email: l.pellicano@ioe.ac.uk 
 
  
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Our perceptual experience is influenced both by incoming sensory information and prior 
knowledge about the world: a concept recently formalized within Bayesian decision theory. We 
propose that Bayesian models can be applied to autism – a neurodevelopmental condition with 
atypicalities in sensation and perception – to pinpoint fundamental differences in perceptual 
mechanisms. We suggest specifically that attenuated Bayesian priors – hypo-priors – may be 
responsible for the unique perceptual experience of autistic people, leading to a tendency to 
perceive the world more accurately rather than modulated by prior experience. In this account, 
we consider how hypo-priors might explain the key features of autism – the broad range of 
sensory and other non-social atypicalities – in addition to the phenomenological differences in 
autistic perception. 
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Autism is a heritable, lifelong neurodevelopmental condition that has its most striking effects on 
social communication – the so-called social symptoms. Yet the condition is also defined by a 
less well-researched range of non-social symptoms. These symptoms present throughout 
development, are prevalent in autistic individuals regardless of intellectual ability, and vary 
widely from an intense desire for sameness (like following rigid routines) and sensory 
atypicalities (such as extreme sensitivity to florescent lighting or to the sound of the school bell) 
to remarkable talents (such as an excellent eye for detail).  
These symptoms feature prominently in the draft changes to the forthcoming diagnostic 
guidelines for autism [1] but the range and idiosyncrasy of sensory atypicalities in particular still 
represent some of the most puzzling features of autism. They include not only hypersensitivity 
to incoming stimuli but also hyposensitivity to stimuli and sensory seeking behaviours such as 
attraction to light, intense looking at objects and fascination with brightly coloured objects [2, 
3]. Indeed, they often oscillate between these states within the same individual. They can also 
have catastrophic effects on the lives of autistic people. As Donna Williams reports first hand: 
“the sensory overload caused by bright lights, fluorescent lights, colours, and patterns makes 
the body react as if being attacked or bombarded, resulting in such physical symptoms as 
headaches, anxiety, panic attacks or aggression” [4, p. 43].  
There has been renewed research interest in these sensory symptoms, prompted in 
part by the possibility that the non-social symptoms of autism might be attributable to 
fundamental differences in sensation and perception [5-10]. In this article, we propose a new 
account of the sensory and other non-social symptoms of autism, which we believe provides a 
parsimonious explanation for such atypicalities; that people with autism see the world more 
accurately – as it really is – as a consequence of being less biased by prior experiences. 
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We start with the suggestion that it is not sensory processing itself that is different in 
autism, but the interpretation of sensory input to yield percepts. We further propose that 
Bayesian decision theory, a principled description of the processes that enable observers to 
derive the most probable interpretations of their environment (see Box 1), provides a powerful 
tool to study the mechanisms underlying the diverse range of non-social features in autism. 
Such computational methods should formalise the process of generating experimentally testable 
hypotheses about the underlying functional atypicalities in autistic perception. Specifically we 
suggest that atypicalities exist at the level of our internal, working models of the world – priors 
in Bayesian terms – and that these lead to characteristic differences in autistic sensation and 
perception.  
 
Perceptual processing in autism 
It has long been known that perceptual processing is unusual in autism. Early studies reported 
autistic exceptional performance on the Embedded Figures Test, finding hidden figures (e.g., 
triangle) within larger meaningful drawings (e.g., pram) [11]. Other studies have shown less 
susceptibility to visual illusions [12], the prevalence of absolute pitch [13], enhanced 
performance on visual search tasks [14, 15] and superior visual discrimination [5, 16]. These 
initial studies spawned a raft of further investigations [see 17], generally revealing atypicalities in 
the perception of characteristically non-social stimuli, such as chromatic stimuli [18], isolated 
tones [19], coherently moving dots [20] and complex objects [21], as well as social stimuli, 
including faces [21, 22], eye-gaze direction [23, 24], biological motion [25, 26], and speech [27]. 
There have been several influential accounts of the non-social symptoms and perceptual 
processing differences in autism, which each differ with regard to the precise nature of the 
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atypicality. Frith and Happé’s weak central coherence hypothesis (1989; Happé & Frith, 2006) 
was the first to suggest that the non-social symptoms in autism – the weaknesses and the 
strengths – could be explained by a domain-general processing style that afforded “privileged 
access to parts and details” (Frith & Happé, 1994, p. 122) and resulted in difficulties processing 
information in context. Later, they suggested that problems in top-down modulation could lead 
to hypersensitivity to sensory stimuli in autism (“naming the pitch of the ‘pop’ of a cork”) and 
that a detail-focused processing style caused the characteristic “insistence on sameness” (Happé 
& Frith, 2006).  
Others have posited alternative accounts, which move beyond the focus on local-global 
processing in autism, and place autistic differences squarely in the realm of perception. 
Plaisted [9] proposed that autistic individuals’ perceptual atypicalities were due to 
enhanced discrimination, possibly from enhanced lateral inhibition in perception. Similarly, 
Mottron et al. [8] (2006) suggest within their “Enhanced Perceptual Functioning” (EPF) 
account that autistic perception is characterized by enhancements in bottom-up, feed-
forward perceptual operations. These authors [28] further suggest that autistic perception is 
autonomous from higher-level, top-down influences and may involve a one-to-one or veridical 
mapping process. On this account, hypersensitivity in autism results from an imbalance in 
inhibitory and excitatory connectivity between local neural networks in sensory regions [see 
also 5, 9, 10, 29, 30].  
Despite their prominence in the autism field, the impact of these accounts has been 
limited both by the lack of data demonstrating an empirical link between theoretical constructs 
– such as “top-down control” – and autistic sensory and other non-social atypicalities and, in 
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some cases, by their overly descriptive nature, failing to fully specify the underlying (altered) 
mechanisms, that is, the nature of the computations.  
Moreover, these accounts focus predominantly on enhancements in sensation and 
perception (hypersensitivity) in autism. Yet the nature and degree of sensory atypicalities in 
autism – hypersensitivity, hyposensitivity and sensory seeking behaviours – vary enormously and 
reportedly fluctuate even within the same individuals. These sensory but also the other non-
social features of autism present a serious challenge for current explanations of autism. 
Furthermore, such theories also have difficulty accounting for an apparent paradox, first noted 
by Kanner [31] in which “the child himself can happily make as great a noise as any that he 
dreads and move objects about to his heart’s content” (p. 245), despite being distressed by 
incoming noises or movements. What is particularly unsettling for autistic individuals is 
therefore the unexpected and unpredictable nature of external events. We suggest that 
understanding how perceptual systems deal with uncertainty is key to explaining atypicalities in 
autistic sensation and perception.  
 
Perception as inference 
Recognizing that retinal images are inherently ambiguous, Helmholtz [32] suggested that 
perception is a process of unconscious inference: automatic and unconscious “best 
guesses” about the structure of the world, consistent with both the retinal images and past 
experience. Gregory  [33] advanced a similar idea, that perception is an active process of 
formulating and testing hypotheses about the structure of the world. He richly illustrated his 
idea with vivid examples of visual illusions, such as perceiving a physical hollow mask as a 
convex face. Seeing familiar shapes or images in the clouds, or the “ghostly” surfaces of the 
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Kanizsa triangle, are examples of the brain postulating the most likely interpretation for noisy, 
ambiguous sensory signals (see Figure 1).  
Bayesian statistical decision theory, a principled method of optimal reasoning under 
uncertainty, formalizes Helmoltz’s and Gregory’s notions of perception as unconscious inference 
[34-37]. Box 1 lays out the basic principles of Bayesian inverse inference, illustrated by the 
specific example of Figure 2. The simple image of the figure is consistent with many different 
physical shapes, depending on viewpoint, described by the likelihood function; but some are 
more prevalent in normal viewing than others, leading to a probability distribution referred to 
as the prior. The prior is combined with the likelihood to yield the posterior probability 
distribution, narrower than either the prior or the likelihood, whose maximum is taken as the 
statistically best estimate of the shape creating that image. If the prior is appropriate, the 
Bayesian framework provides the most efficient method to infer the 3D shape corresponding to 
the simple 2D line drawing.  
In the real world, many other forms of knowledge are available as priors to aid 
disambiguation, such as the fact that light more probably comes from above, so shading can 
provide useful information [38]. Priors can explain many visual illusions. For example, the 
Kanizsa triangle (see Figure 1) is equally consistent with a continuous white triangle 
superimposed over three regular black circles, or three unlikely “pac-men” arranged 
symmetrically to face each other: the natural statistics of the world makes the single triangle 
more probable. Similarly, an a priori preference for slow speeds can aid disambiguation of 
motion direction, but is also consistent with many illusory perceptions of incorrect velocity 
[39]. Consistent with Gregory’s view, these authors regard illusions not as perceptual errors or 
8 
 
“sloppy computations”, but are a consequence of statistically optimal computations that are 
functionally beneficial in the real world [39].   
In general, priors improve the efficiency of computations by reducing overall noise or 
error. Even when images are not ambiguous, this can be advantageous. For example, 
psychophysical judgments of almost all quantities – length, duration, number, color, weight, 
force – show the tendency to gravitate towards mean magnitude [40]. This fact has been well 
known for at least 100 years, but still not well understood. Recently Jazayeri and Shadlen [41] 
suggested that central tendency may represent another statistically optimal strategy, 
incorporating prior knowledge of the statistics of the environment in psychophysical judgments. 
They suggest that the mean duration (or length, color, or weight) of the recent history acts as a 
prior, biasing judgments towards the mean. Although judgments are biased (“inaccurate”), 
reliability is improved and overall error-rate is reduced. Interestingly, this theoretical approach 
(supported by clear data [41, 42]) suggests that priors do not need to be learned over a 
lifetime, but can be modulated over a relatively short timescale, in the order of minutes.  
The above examples are intentionally simple, with only a few relevant variables such as 
curvature and slant, but the principles readily extend to high-dimensional space. Furthermore, 
advances in computational neuroscience are beginning to demonstrate how such probabilistic 
inference is instantiated in the brain. Some have shown that populations of neurons can code 
entire probability distributions relating to a stimulus and also the degree of uncertainty for 
computations like cue combination [43]. Others have suggested that probabilistic perception 
and learning should be better implemented with sampling-based approaches, whereby single 
neurons map on to inferred variables and uncertainty is represented by the variability of neural 
activity patterns [44]. Intriguingly, these authors have proposed that a priori beliefs about the 
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world (priors) reside in spontaneous cortical activity (activity in the absence of sensory 
stimulation) – activity which is thought to be atypical in autism [45].  
 
Autistic perception within a Bayesian framework 
We suggest that the Bayesian framework could be particularly useful for deriving testable 
hypotheses about functional atypicalities in autistic perception. Specifically, we propose that 
altered autistic perception results from atypicalities at the level of the prior – either in its 
construction or in combining appropriately with sensory information – yielding unusually 
attenuated priors or hypo-priors (see Figure 2). The suggestion here is not that individuals with 
autism have no priors, rather that their priors are broader. If true, we would expect that fewer 
internal constraints on perception – hypo-priors – should have substantial effects on autistic 
individuals’ perceptual experiences.  
One prediction is that hypo-priors should result in more “accurate” perception. As 
mentioned above, Bayesian priors sacrifice accuracy (understood as average closeness to 
physical reality) for improved precision (reliability), resulting in an overall reduction of error. 
Under many conditions, strong (narrow) priors can bias perception towards the prior, away 
from the maximum likelihood, which is based only on sensory information. Hypo-priors in 
autism should distort sensory signals less, consistent with the often-reported superior 
performance of autistic individuals [46-50]. They are, for example, less susceptible to illusions 
such as the Kanizsa, Titchener, Poggendorf and Shepard “table-illusion” [7, 12] (see Figure 1). 
Individuals with autism are also better at copying impossible figures [51] and are more accurate 
when asked to reproduce a slanted circle (ellipse) in the absence of perspective cues [52]. In all 
these somewhat artificial tasks, priors should actually impede performance.  
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A second prediction is that hypo-priors should impede performance in situations where 
priors help resolve ambiguity. For example, cast-shadows provided useful information about 
shape, if interpreted appropriately [38], and indeed make objects more recognizable for typical 
individuals. For autistic children, however, cast shadows hinder recognition [53] – a finding that 
is consistent with the suggestion that autistic children make less use of prior information to 
interpret shadows appropriately. In this case, cast shadows just add to the perceptual noisiness 
of an image [38].  
A third, and less obvious, prediction is that hypo-priors in autism could cause the often-
reported sense of being overwhelmed by sensory information. Mukchopadhyay describes the 
experience of seeing everything afresh, rather than mediated by prior knowledge and 
expectation: “I began to fear all those unknown paths, clothes, shoes, chairs and strange human 
voices. Each one challenged me by putting me in front of a new situation for me to face and 
understand...” [3]. There are two ways that hypo-priors may lead to this form of phenomenon. 
Priors – such as the example of central tendency – smooth variations in sensory input, often 
caused by measurement error rather than real variability: hypo-priors would result in more 
unexpected variability, even in constant stimuli. Alternatively, they could affect the learning 
process itself. Recent accounts show how knowledge of underlying image statistics is 
fundamental for learning [44] – as it is for perception. Attenuated priors could result in reduced 
capacity for generalization during learning, akin to what is known as “overfitting” in computer 
vision, fitting a model to noisy data rather than to the general trend. In both cases, hypo-priors 
would result in a mismatch between expectations and measurement, which could lead to 
phenomenological reports like Mukchopadhyay’s.  
11 
 
A Bayesian framework might also help us to interpret findings of reduced adaptation in 
autism. Adaptation – ubiquitous in perceptual systems – is a rapid form of experience-
dependent plasticity where sensory experience affects the response properties of neurons and, 
ultimately, perception [54]. It is generally accepted that adaptation serves to auto-calibrate 
perceptual systems to their environment [55, 56]. The effects of adaptation in autism have been 
investigated with the face aftereffect, where prolonged exposure to a specific facial identity 
biases subsequent perception away from that identity [57]. Children with autism showed 
significantly less adaptation than typical children. Critically, their perception was more accurate, in 
that the target face corresponded better to physical reality than to expectations. Subsequent 
studies have demonstrated diminished adaptation in autism for other sensory modalities, 
including touch [58], and for relatives of autistic children [59].   
Adaptation does not always cause negative effects. In a recent study, Chopin and 
Mamassian [60] have shown that the effects of adaptation depend on when in the past the 
adapting stimuli occur. Recent adaptors affect the current percept negatively, biasing – for 
example – the perceived tilt in the direction opposite to the adaptors; adapting stimuli further 
in the past act in the opposite way, biasing tilt in the same direction as the adaptors. These 
results have very important implication for Bayesian explanations of adaptation {Stocker, 2006 
#55; Clifford, 2012 #213}. Self-calibration theories of adaptation assume that the brain has 
some internal model of the expected distribution of response states. Within the Bayesian 
framework, the positive effects of adaptation of remote stimuli [60] suggest that the brain 
continually learns and updates the probability distributions of the world, over a moderately 
short timescale (5-10 minutes): the learnt distributions serve as priors, or standards for self-
calibration. The negative effects of recent stimuli could represent a recalibration of sensory 
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resources under the assumption that the recent history of sensory input should conform to the 
established priors. Clearly, any atypicality at the level of the prior – either in its construction or 
use as a calibration standard – should clearly impact on the magnitude of adaptation. That is, 
hypo-priors in autistic perception may lead to difficulties in using information from the remote 
past to drive expectations about incoming sensory signals. 
 
Hypo-priors may explain many of the non-social symptoms of autism 
Hypo-priors in autism should cause a greater reliance on bottom-up, incoming sensory signals, 
which could in turn result in enhancement of sensory stimuli more broadly. Enhanced 
sensations, or “super qualia” [62] are consistent with the often-reported hypersensitivity to 
sensory information [4, 63]. Attenuated prior knowledge could also explain the co-occurrence 
of hyposensitivity and hypersensitivity within the same individuals. Without a template against 
which to match observed sensory evidence, the individual is less able to anticipate the 
forthcoming sensory environment in order to resolve perceptual ambiguity. Fewer internal 
constraints could also lead to a sense of alarm and the often-reported experience of sensory 
overload. Sensory symptoms in autism would therefore not be due to fundamental differences 
in sensory processing per se but rather reflect atypicalities in the way that incoming information 
is interpreted by sensory systems.  
Furthermore, since it is assumed by Bayesian theory (see Box 1) that priors are altered 
according to the specific stimuli the individual encounters, the idiosyncratic pattern of sensory 
seeking (e.g., attraction to spinning objects) and hyper-sensitivity to stimuli (e.g., aversion to 
vacuum cleaners) is likely to be determined by the amount of and intensity of exposure to 
particular stimuli in the individual’s environment.  
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Hypo-priors might also explain why autistic behaviours can be stereotyped and resistant 
to change. Prior knowledge should aid in the interpretation of predictable sensory events. 
Sensory experiences that are less constrained by prior knowledge should therefore make it 
difficult to use knowledge derived from the past to generate predictions about the occurrence 
of new sensory events. This may shed light on the intense desire for sameness in autism, which 
may be not a problem with change per se, but in predicting the change. Becoming comfortable 
with new situations might also require many more exposures to a stimulus or context to 
overcome the potentially disadvantageous effects of less specific priors.  
Well-known repetitive or “stimming” behaviours such as rocking, finger flicking, hand 
flapping, might also be accounted for by hypo-priors. Less specific priors could result in reduced 
generalization, which in turn could constrain motor plans to those that are already known. 
Without the moderating effect of priors, self-generated repetitive behaviours – those over 
which the individual has full control – might be a means of reducing the uncertainty in the 
environment.  
  
Conclusion  
In this article we have proposed that the formal, computational principles of a Bayesian 
framework offer a way forward in identifying the causal mechanisms of altered autistic 
perception. We have suggested here that autistic people tend to perceive the world more 
accurately as a consequence of hypo-priors or less bias by prior experience – a notion that fits 
well with extant empirical data. Certain aspects of our account have been raised previously [6, 
7]. The distinct advantage of our account is that it has greater explanatory power than existing 
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theories by providing a unifying explanation of the sensory and other non-social features of 
autism, as well as atypicalities (both weaknesses and strengths) in autistic perception.  
The Bayesian framework also allows for concepts like top-down knowledge and 
contextual processing to be translated into testable theories about the strength or reliability of 
priors, and therefore serves as an excellent platform to assess the internal coherence and 
completeness of these ideas. Indeed, such methods should help to specify the precise nature of 
the atypicality – whether it lies either in the application of priors or in the learning and 
generating of new priors, or indeed in both [cf 44]. Future empirical work and computational 
modelling will no doubt determine its usefulness in elucidating the autistic experience of the 
world (see Outstanding Questions), and will hopefully lead to suggestions of how they may 
better cope with it. 
  
15 
 
Acknowledgements 
We extremely grateful to Dorothy Bishop, Tom Griffiths, Rebecca Lawson, Kate Plaisted-
Grant, Marc Stears and Catherine Stoodley for helpful discussions and to Colin Clifford, 
Laurent Mottron and three anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on a previous 
version of this manuscript. This work was supported by a grant from the UK’s Medical 
Research Council (MR/J013145/1) and European Union FP7-ERC “STANIB”. Research at CRAE 
is also supported by The Clothworkers’ Foundation and Pears Foundation. 
 
  
16 
 
 
Glossary 
Adaptation: A dynamic process in which neural sensitivity is continuously recalibrated to 
“match” the characteristics of the current environment. 
Aftereffect: The perceptual distortions that arise following lengthy exposure or adaptation to 
a stimulus.  
Autism: Autism spectrum disorders are a set of common, lifelong neurodevelopmental 
conditions defined in terms of the presence of difficulties in social communication and social 
interaction, and a range of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, 
including sensory sensitivities.  
Bayesian inverse inference: A method of statistical inference in which Bayes’ rule is used 
with reference to an unknown variable (see Box 1).  
Hypo-priors: A term we use to describe attenuated prior knowledge in autism, which 
would be represented as a broad prior probability distribution.  
Likelihood: the function specifying the probability p(xjy) of observing a particular stimulus x 
for each possible state of the environment y.  
Non-social symptoms: The range of autistic symptoms, which include restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, and sensory sensitivities, which are relatively 
non-social in nature and content.   
Posterior: the probability distribution p(yjx) produced by probabilistic inference according 
to a particular probabilistic model of the environment. 
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Prior: the probability distribution p(y) defining the expectation about the environment 
being in any of its possible states, y, before any observation is available.  
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Box 1. The Bayesian approach to object perception  
The Bayesian framework for perception originates in Helmholtz’s [32] notion of perception as 
“unconscious inference”. Helmholtz realised that many images are inherently ambiguous, so 
prior knowledge is necessary to disambiguate them. Recently, this concept has been formalised 
by models based on Bayes’ formula for inverse inference: 
𝑝(𝑆|𝐼) =
𝑝(𝐼|𝑆)𝑝(𝑆)
𝑝(𝐼)
 
where S is the shape of the object and I the image formed by it. Figure 2 illustrates a 
simple example. The image (I) in panel A is ambiguous, consistent with multiple objects and 
viewpoints, including the three illustrated in the panel: most observers’ first impression is a half-
pipe (or Tuscan roof tile) viewed from above, but it can be “willed” into other configurations, 
such as a convex tile. The full range of shapes consistent with the (noisy) measurement of image 
I is given by the likelihood function (I|S: panel B). To be consistent with the image, the curvature 
of the physical object must increase as the object surface slant approaches zero (orthogonal to 
line of sight). However, it can never reach 0 or ±π/2, as neither extreme could produce the 
two crescents with connecting lines. The object curvature could either be positive (concave), 
or negative (convex), depending on slant, but could not be positive for negative slant or vice 
versa. The scatter of probabilities around the functions reflects the noisiness (imprecision) in 
measuring the image (I). Panel C shows an example of a typical prior, a distribution of probable 
shapes. Humans show a preference for the from-above viewpoint, and also for curvatures equal 
to or smaller than circles. When multiplied by the likelihood, it gives a posterior probability 
function (panel D), far more constrained than the likelihood. The maximum a posteriori (MAP) is 
the peak of this function, the best Bayesian guess of the shape to produce the image max(p(S|I)), 
falling close to shape Y. Note that there is also a small mound corresponding to negative 
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curvature, corresponding to the less favoured but possible interpretation, shape Z. If the prior 
were attenuated (more distributed), as in panel E, it would constrain the image less (panel F), 
leaving X, Y and Z almost equally probable. It is possible that this is the case with autism.  
How the prior is generated remains open to question, many believing it develops over 
the lifespan, and perhaps evolves over generations. However, several recent studies [41, 42, 60] 
suggest that even 5-10 minutes of learning can be sufficient to alter the prior.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Some examples that powerfully demonstrate the importance of prior knowledge in 
interpreting ambiguous bottom-up information. A. The Kanizsa triangle: three circles with 
segments missing and a triangle placed directly in front of them. The edges of the triangle are 
not really there, but would be for the most probable physical interpretation, a white triangle 
overlaying three regular circles. B. The Hollow-face illusion. A strong bias (or “prior”) for 
natural concave faces offsets competing information (such as shadows) and causes one to 
perceive a concave, hollow mask (right) as a normal convex face (left). C. Shepard’s table 
illusion. The two-dimensional images of the tabletop parallelograms are in fact identical. 
However, the image is consistent with many three-dimensional shapes, the most probable being 
real tables slanting at about 45°: to be consistent with the identical 2-D images, the tables need 
to be of very different dimensions.  
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Figure 2. Illustration of how Bayesian priors can 
help resolve perceptual ambiguities (see Box 1 
for more detailed explanation). A. An image (I) 
of a Tuscan Coppo tile, consistent with many 
physical shapes (S), three of which are 
illustrated (X, Y & Z). B. The likelihood 
function I|S shows the physical compatibilities of 
scene interpretations S with image I, plotting 
curvature of the image (where 1/R is a half-
circle) against image slant (where 0 represents a 
top view, π/2 end-on). X, Y & Z correspond to 
the examples in A. C. An estimate of a typical 
observer’s prior, corresponding to a preference 
for low curvatures, and for perceiving objects 
from above. D. When the prior is multiplied by 
the likelihood to yield the posterior, the range 
of solutions is much more confined. The 
maximum of the posterior (MAP) is the best 
Bayesian estimate of the shape S to generate 
image I (corresponding to Z). E. A prior like 
that in panel C, except 10 times broader, as 
may be the case in autism. F. When this prior is 
multiplied by the likelihood, the posterior is far 
less constrained, and all three possibilities X, Y 
& Z are possible. 
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Outstanding Questions 
 Is the in-built prior knowledge (prior) of people with autism attenuated compared to 
typically developing individuals of similar age and ability? 
 Can people with autism modify prior knowledge – to the same extent as typically 
developing individuals? What are the effects of imposing an experimentally controlled prior 
[cf. 64]? 
 Do individual differences in the strength of priors relate to differences in the degree of 
autistic symptoms (e.g., sensory sensitivities)?  
 Can the idiosyncratic pattern of sensory atypicalities in an individual be accounted for by 
differences in exposure to particular environmental stimuli? 
 Why is social information processing especially at risk in autism? Is it because social stimuli 
are inherently more complex and ambiguous than non-social stimuli?  
 Is the way that people with autism view the world around them characterized by “Bayesian 
surprise” [65]?  
 How can this account be related to Bayesian models of other neuropsychiatric conditions? 
For example, in schizophrenia, hallucinations are assumed to result from hyper-priors [66, 
67], which would place autistic and schizophrenic symptoms at the extremes of a 
continuum. 
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